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EMPLOYMENT OF CORPORATE EXECUTIVES
BY MAJORITY STOCKHOLDERS
By JOHN F. MECK, JAt
"THE BUSINESS of a corporation shall be managed by its board of
directors." 1 In this simple, abrupt statement is embodied a rule of law
which is part of the corporation statutes of almost every state.2 Though
innocuous on its face, this rule has been applied by the courts with telling
effect to invalidate a particular type of contract, and much chagrin has
been caused to the unsuspecting lawyers who drew such contracts.
The contract involved is one between the majority stockholder and
one of the minority stockholders of a corporation in which the large
proportion of the stock is owned by a single individual or by another
corporation.3 The contract'ordinarily imposes upon the majority stock-
holder at least two personal obligations: first, that the minority stock-
holder shall be a director of the corporation; and second and more
important, that he shall hold a certain executive position in the corporate
management at a specified compensation, for a period of time which may
be a definite number of years or for as long as he holds his minority
stock interest, or in some instances for his lifetime. These two integral
obligations are well illustrated by the contract in the case of Clark. v.
Dodge, which obligated the majority stockholder to vote his stock and
to vote as a director so that the minority stockholder should: (1) con-
tinue as a director of the corporation; (2) continue as its general manager
-- so long as he was "faithful, efficient and competent"; and (3) receive
one-fourth of the net income of the corporation either by way of salary
or dividends. While no period of time was specified for the duration of
the contract, it was implicit that it should last for the lifetime of the
contracting minority stockholder.4
tAssistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. N. Y. Gzax. CoRp. LAw § 27.
2. Thirty-eight states have statutory provisions similar to that of New York, six-
teen being almost identical with it. There is little doubt but that the rule is implicit in
the corporation laws of the remaining states.
3. A rough estimate, based on some thirty cases involving contracts of the tyFe
here under consideration, discloses that in over half there was a single majority stock-
holder. Of the remainder many were cases where two stockholders, because of family
or other ties, may be considered for all practical purposes as a single majority sto:-
holder. The instances where a large number of stockholders combined to form a
majority interest and then entered into a contract of this type are relatively few.
4. 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936). A further provision prohibited the pay-
ment of "unreasonable or incommensurate salaries" to other officers which would have
the effect of reducing the net income of the corporation and thereby substantially affect
the minority stockholder's one-fourth interest therein.
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For over fifty years courts have been prone to hold invalid the second
obligation contained in this type of contract on the ground that it violated
the rule that the business of a corporation shall be managed by its board
of directors.' The agreement, of course, falls within the category of
contracts for executive employment which ordinarily are not enforcible
by a decree of specific performance.' But notwithstanding the fact that
an employee usually may recover damages for a breach of an employ-
ment contract by his employer, courts deny even this remedy for repudia-
tion of the bargain by the majority stockholder. Despite such judicial
disapproval, attempts constantly are being made to use such agreements.
While no single explanation is adequate, the reason probably lies in the
fact that such contracts afford a practical solution for certain problems
of corporate management, particularly in the case of those corporations
with only a few stockholders, which are little more than chartered part-
nerships.7 In most of the cases one or both of two similar factual situa-
tions will be found. A corporation may desire to expand through the
absorption of a smaller enterprise. The owner of the latter, having no
inclination to retire from business, will consent to the combination only
upon being assured an executive position in the management of the com-
bined enterprises.' Or a corporation may have reached a point where
the services of an experienced executive are essential to the successful
operation of the business. To get an individual of the requisite ability,
or in some instances to retain such a person in the corporation's employ,
a status above that of a mere employee must be offered." In either situa-
tion a process of bargaining takes place, resulting ordinarily in an under-
standing that the particular individual shall become a stockholder and
director of the corporation, and that he shall occupy an executive position
giving him a measure of control over the corporate affairs.
Often, however, the prospective executive will want more than a mere
understanding that all this will take place. He may desire some legal
remedy which will enable him to insist that the terms of the agreement be
carried out or which will afford him some means of redress in the event
5. Confined to the cases in which the issue of the validity of such contracts was
presented squarely, a rough calculation would be that in over two-thirds the courts in-
validated the contracts.
6. But cf. Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936) ;Jones v. Williams,
139 Mo. 1, 39 S. W. 486, 40 S. IN. 353 (1897) (injunction).
7. There is no reason why this type of contract cannot be used in the case of large
corporations, and isolated instances of such use can be found.
8. E.g., West v. Camden, 135 U. S. 507 (1890) ; Thielsen v. Blake, Moflitt & Towne,
142 Ore. 59, 17 P. (2d) 560 (1932) ; cf. Mansfield v. Lang, 200 N. I-. 110 (Mass. 1936).
When used in this way the contract often will be found to be part of a general pre-
organization agreement by which a new corporate entity is to be ')rmtd.
9. E.g., Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936) : Hayden v. Beane,
199 N. E. 755 (Mass. 1936) ; Timme v. Kopmeier, 162 Wis. 571, 156 N. W. 961 (1916).
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they are not. A method which at once suggests itself is a contract with
the corporation obligating it to carry out the various provisions of the
understanding. Such contracts are quite common, but there are several
reasons why they are unsatisfactory and why the incoming executive will
attempt to secure a contract with the majority stockholder. Negotiations
usually will be conducted personally with the dominant stockholder, for
an individual seeking effective legal protection naturally will disregard
the fiction of the corporate entity and seek to bind directly the ultimate
power in the corporate affairs."0 If at any time the ouster of such an
individual is contemplated, a majority stockholder who may be held
personally responsible is less likely to disregard the consequences than
he would be if only the corporation were liable. Furthermore, serious
doubts may exist as to the validity of a contract binding a corporation
to keep an individual in a specified office, especially in regard to the term
for which the office is to be held. In some instances these doubts arise
from statutory provisions;11 in others from a feeling on the part of
the courts that such contracts improperly restrict the judgment of future
boards of directors.1 2 Finally, since the directors are elected by the
10. E.g., Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S. W. 486, 40 S. NV. 353 (1897). There
the majority stockholder was the famous newspaper owner, Joseph Pulitzer, and the
corporation published the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Pulitzer's domination of the man-
agement of the newspaper which his corporations controlled -as common knowledge, and
no one would have thought of dealing in any way except directly with Pulitzer. While
the court interpreted the contract as having been made by Pulitzer on behalf of the
corporation, the decision is still applicable to the problem here under consideration.
For the background of this case, see SEIz, JOSEPH PV:LTzER, His LIFE & LErTRs (1924)
191 et seq.
11. For example the National Banking Act provides that the board of directors may
remove officers "at will." REv. STAT. § 5136 (1875), 12 U. S. C. § 24 (1934). The Nevv
York statutes provide that the directors may remove officers "at pleasure." N. Y. Sw'ocn
CoRP. LAw § 60. West Virginia and Washington formerly had similar provisions which
have since been repealed. Under the National Banking Act the courts uniformly held
that officers employed under contracts for a term of years nonetheless could be removed
without liability to the corporation. The New York courts have never squarely passed
on the point, but in the federal court the New York statute has been interpreted as not
relieving the corporation from liability. In re Paramount Publix Corp., 90 F. (2d) 441
(C. C. A. 2d, 1937). See generally, Comment (1937) 50 HARv. L. RIv. 518.
It is interesting to note that several states have recently enacted a provision clearing
up this difficulty. It permits the board of directors to remove any officer whenever it is
deemed in the best interests of the corporation to do so, but expressly provides that such
removal is without prejudice to the contract rights of the person so removed. See IDAHO
CoDE AN. (1932) § 29-140; IL.. Rv. STAT. (1937) c. 32, § 157.43; LA. GN. STAT. A:m.
(Dart, 1932) § 1115; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 15, § 2852-407; W,sr.
Rnv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 3803-31. This type of provision is also in the
Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 32.
12. This feeling is particularly stroiig in cases were the employment contracts pur-
port to be perpetual or for the lifetime of the employee. Carney v. New York Life Insur-
ance Co., 162 N. Y. 453, 57 N. E. 78 (1900); Borland v. John F. Sass Printing Co.,
95 Colo. 53, 32 P. (2d) 827 (1934) ; Beaton v. Continental Southland Say. & Loan Assn,
HeinOnline  -- 47 Yale L. J. 1081 1937-1938
THE IALE LAW JOURNAL
stockholders, it is apparent that the corporation itself lacks power to
make anyone a director. For these reasons the prospective executive will
seek as many other safeguards as his bargaining position will permit. If
it is sufficiently strong he may force negotiations to the point where the
majority stockholder agrees personally to guarantee his right to partici-
pate in the management of the corporate affairs. A further possibility
is that the ultimate "deal" may give him two strings to his bow through
a contract binding both the corporation and the majority stockholder.
That such a double guarantee may be highly desirable will appear later.
Before turning to specific reasons for the frequent invalidation of these
contracts it is worth while first to look at the underlying legal theory
with respect to the management of the business of a corporation and
to contrast that theory with the practical situation of a corporation with
a single majority stockholder. There will be found in every corporation
three groups of persons; the stockholders, the directors, and the executive
officers. Often these groups will overlap, for some of the stockhblders
may be directors and some of the directors may be executive officers.
But so far as legal theory is concerned each group has its own distinct
functions and only those of the directors and the executive officers are
regarded as functions of management. Of these two groups the board
of directors is the central authority in the management of the business
and usually included within its major duties will be that of selecting and
supervising the executive officers. Thus, the function of choosing the
corporate officers ordinarily falls within the scope of the rule that the
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by its board of directors. 1
101 S. W. (2d) 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), (1937) 85 U. or PA. L. Ray. 849. If the term
of the employment is limited, a court may uphold the contract, as in Realty Acceptance
Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930), where the duration of the
contract was five years.
13. An examination of the general corporation statutes of the various states reveals
that eleven states seem to have no explicit statutory provision as to the manner of elect-
ing the corporate officers. But since most of the corporate powers are exercised by the
board of directors, in those states it would be reasonable to conclude that the election of
the officers is a function properly belonging to the board of directors. The statutes of
thirteen states expressly provide that the president, secretary, treasurer and other officers
shall be elected by the board of dirctors. Of the statutes of seven states providing that
the president, secretary and treasurer shall be elected by the board of directors, three
provide that the other officers shall be elected in the manner set forth in the by-laws, and
four in the manner provided in the by-laws or determined by the board of directors. Six
provide that the president, secretary and treasurer shall be elected by the board of di-
rectors and say nothing as to the manner of election of the other officers. Two provide
that all the officers shall be elected in the manner provided in the by-laws and two more
that all the officers shall be elected in the manner provided in the by-laws or in the cer-
tificate of incorporation. In ove state the provi-ion is tbat the lpresi'lent, secretary and
treasurer shall be elected by the board of directors or aq deteriiivel by the by-laws.
Another has the provision that the president shall lie elected by the stockholde.s and the
other officers as provided in the by-laws. In five, Delaware, New Jersey. New Mexico,
[Vol. 47: 10791082
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Outside the corporate management lie the stockholders, who in legal
theory are supposed to have no control over the management of the cor-
porate affairs save that which they possess by reason of their power to
elect the members of the board of directors once each year. Having
elected the directors the power of the stockholders is regarded as being
exhausted until the next election, except in reference to certain special
matters in which they are consulted by reason of statutory, charter, or
by-law provisions. Once elected the directors are supposed to perform
their duties with the view of furthering the interests of the corporation
as a whole and not the interests of the particular stockholders who elected
them, save in so far as the latter happen to coincide with the former.
Thus, the law regards the directors as being in no sense the agents of
the stockholders, but on the contrary insists that in performing their
functions they exercise an independent and uncontrolled judgment. This
theory is said to be founded on a public policy, one of the purposes of
which is to protect the stockholders of the corporation, and to a lesser
extent, its creditors and the general public. Out of it has come the rule
that a corporation shall be managed by its board of directors, and any
device which tends to lessen the power of the directors in this respect runs
serious risk of invalidation by the courts.
The application of this legal theory to- the practical situation of a
corporation with a single majority stockholder at once reveals certain
inconsistencies. There is 'no doubt but that the majority stockholder is
in a position to and often does exercise a substantial amount of control
over the board of directors, and through them over the executive officers
as well. Frequently the majority stockholder will be both a director and
an executive officer and thus participate directly in the management of
the corporate affairs. In other instances he will not occupy these posi-
tions, but will be content with exercising an indirect but no less effective
control by means of his power to dominate the board of directors. Where
the majority stockholder is another corporation the situation is much the
same, the influential persons usually being the directors and executive
officers of the majority stockholder-corporation. In any event the ma-
jority stockholder normally possesses the ultimate power to determine
who shall be both the directors and the executive officers of the corpora-
tion.
Legislatures, courts, and legal writers have all recognized the patent
danger in the possibility that the majority stockholder will control the
corporation .for his own benefit without regard for the interests of the
minority stockholders, who, unrepresented on the board of directors,
North Carolina and Pennsylvania, the statutes provide that the president, secretary and
treasurer shall be elected either by the board of directors or by the stockholders, as de-
termined by the by-laws. As to the relevance of the statutes of These five states to the
problem under consideration here, see page 1098, infra. See also note 33, infra.
HeinOnline  -- 47 Yale L. J. 1083 1937-1938
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
may be unable even to ascertain what goes on in the management of the
corporate affairs. Largely with this in mind many states have curtailed
partially the power of the majority stockholder by providing for cunu-
lative voting in the election of directors. As another protection the courts
have developed the doctrine, now often included in corporation statutes,
that in certain situations giving rise to a conflict of interest the relation
between the majority stockholder and the minority stockholders will be
regarded as a fiduciary one. Thus, in many instances the underlying legal
theory has been modified to meet the realities of the situation, and a
similar modification of the rule that the business of a corporation shall
be managed by its board of directors would be quite proper so far as the
type of contract here under consideration is concerned.
To consider the problem more specifically, it is helpful first to look
at its broad outlines and then to examine particular cases. The contract
ordinarily imposes two basic obligations upon the majority stockholder,
the one that the contracting minority stockholder shall be a director of
the corporation, and the other that he shall hold a specified executive
position. The first of these two obligations is very analogous to the
so-called "pooling agreements" by which several stockholders, none of
whom has a majority stock interest, agree to vote their shares as a unit
so that certain individuals, usually themselves, will be elected directors.
Though in a few states serious doubts exist, the first provision generally
is recognized today as a perfectly legal device.14 It will not be discussed
further here, and attention will be concentrated on the second obligation
where the situation is much more confused.
The second duty imposed upon the majority stockholder by the con-
tract, through which the minority stockholder is attempting to assure
himself of his position in the corporate management, has not fared so
well in the courts. Today, unless, all the stockholders are parties to the
agreement, it will be invalidated on the ground that it contravenes the
public policy embodied in the rule that a corporation shall be managed
by its board of directors. 5 The line of argument usually advanced is
14. To attain its position of respectability this first obligation underwent years of
attack in the courts. These attacks were based on another public policy argument, which
in some aspects was very similar to the one made against the type of contract under con-
sideration here. Decisions upholding this first obligation include Faulds v. Yates, 57 Il.
416 (1870); Thompson v. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 111. 54, 116 N. E. 648 (1917);
Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105, 55 N. E. 809 (1900). See Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y.
313, 319, 119 N. E. 559. 561 (1918) ; McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 323, 329, 189 N. E.
234. 236 (1934); Withers v. Edmonds, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 189, 191, 62 S. W. 795, 796
(1901). Contra: Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635. 197 S. W. 376 (1917) ; Lothrop
v. Goudeau, 142 La. 342. 76 So. 794 (1917) ; Creed v. Copps, 103 Vt. 164, 152 Atl. 369,
71 A. L. R. 1287 (1930).
15. Decisions upholding such contracts where all the stockholders were parties in-
clude Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214 I1. 59, 73 N. E. 874 (1905) ; Hayden v. Beane, 199
N. E. 755 (Mass., 1936) ; Clark v. Dodge. 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. (41 (10361. These
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that such a provision imposes limitations on the power of the board of
directors to manage the corporate affairs by preventing the directors from
exercising an independent and uncontrolled judgment in the selection of
the executive officers and in fixing their compensations and terms uf
office. This argument finds expression in either of two ways. In some
opinions it is reasoned that because the corporate device is solely a creature
of the state, it can be utilized only in accordance with the rules laid down
by the state. Sinace among tlesc rules is the one that the affairs of a
corporation shall be nanagcd by its board of directors, adherence to that
rule is a prerequisite to the use of the corporate device and any departure
from it will be held invalid. 6 In other decisions the principal emphasis
is upon the idea that limitations imposed upon the judgment of directors
are necessarily injurious to other stockholders who are not parties to the
contract," or in rarer instances, to other classes of persons who need
protection.' s The consideration moving the latter group is in reality the
cases should not be interpreted as indicating that a tendency is developing to regard the
fact that all the stockholders are parties to the contract as creating an exception to the
rule. The proper approach instead would seem to be that this fact is relevant only in
that it conclusively shows that there are no non-contracting minority stockholders whom
the contract can injure.
16. In Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 323, 119 N. E. 559, 562 (1918), the court
said, "Directors are the exclusive, executive representatives of the corporation and are
charged with the administration of its internal affairs and the improvement and use of
its assets. Clearly the law does not permit the stockholders to create a sterilized board
of directors. Corporations are the creatures of the state and must comply with the
exactions and regulations it imposes." See also Rush v. Aunspaugh, 179 Ala. 542. 546,
60 So. 802, 803 (1912); Smith v. California Thorn Cordage, 129 Cal. App. 93, 93, 18 P.
(2d) 393, 395 (1933); Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq. 592, 603, 75 Atl. 568, 573 (1910);
Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 645, 197 S. NV. 376, 390 (1917). Such a considera-
tion opens up the much debated question of the extent to which the corporation may be
used as a device under which to operate an individual or corporate enterprise. Jackson
v. Hooper, supra; Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N. NV. 102 (1921); Salomon V.
Salomon & Co., [1897] A. C. 22.
17. Haldeman v. Haldeman. 176 Ky. 635, 197 S. NV. 376 (1917) ; Scripps v. Sweeney,
160 Mich. 148, 125 N. NV. 72 (1910); Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 8O, 181 N. XV. 102
(1921) ; McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 323, 189 N. E. 234 (1934) ; Timme v. Koap
meer, 162 XWis. 571, 156 N. V. 961 (1916). The usual fear of the courts is that the
contracting minority stockholder will get some private benefit from the contract at the
expense of the other minority stockholders. Many courts regard the employment of the
'contracting minority stockholder at a definite compensation for a period of years a, i
"lucrative position" conferring on him special benefits. Regardless of the fact that the
corporation may have to hire someone for the position anyway, and without 1131,ing
to see whether the salary and the term are reasonable, some courts will say that suclh a
contract results in injury to the non-contracting minority stockholders. Clark v. First
Nat. Bank of Ottumwa, 219 Iowa 637, 259 N. V. 211 (1935); Guernsey v. Coo!:. 124)
Mass. 501 (1876); Thielsen v. Blake, Moffitt & Towne, 142 Ore. 59, 17 P. (2d) 51 '
(1932) ; Withers v. Edmonds, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 189, 62 S. NV. 795 (1901).
18. Cf. Thomas v. Mathews, 94 Ohio St. 32, 113 N. E. 669 (1916); Seitz v. Michel,
148 Minn. 80, 181 N. XV. 102 (1921). In all the cases involving banks, it would seem
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basis of the reasoning relied upon by the former, for the purpose of the
state in laying down this particular rule is chiefly to protect these various
classes of persons. But from the stress placed on the first rationale it
seems that the policy of requiring adherence to this fundamental canon
of corporation law is sufficiently important to some courts to be regarded
as an end in itself.
The dual status of the majority stockholder who is also a director
results in the possibility that limitations may be imposed upon the board
of directors directly and indirectly. Since in a great many cases the
majority stockholder is in fact a director, the contract operates upon him
directly in that capacity, and upon this fact the reasoning of many courts
is founded. As a director the relation of the majority stockholder to
all the stockholders is that of a fiduciary and his duty at all times is to
act for their best interests by exercising his independent and uncontrolled
judgment in all corporate matters, whether it be the selection of the
executive officers or some other question of management. By obligating
himself to keep the contracting minority stockholder in a certain execu-
tive position, the majority stockholder can exercise that independent and
uncontrolled judgment only at the risk of incurring legal liability. In
that one respect he no longer is managing the corporate affairs and has
become merely a passive director. Therefore, so the argument runs, the
contract violates public policy and is illegal.19
Regardless of whether the majority stockholder is a director, the
contract may impose these same limitations indirectly. While the argu-
ment of the courts on this point rarely is made clear, in substance it
would seem to be that the contract obligates the majority stockholder to
elect a board of directors which will be subservient to his will so far as
the selection of the contracting minority stockholder for a specified execu-
tive position is concerned. Indulging in the realistic assumption that the
directors will respect the wishes of the majority stockholder, the courts
find that they are prevented from exercising an independent and uncon-
trolled judgment and thereby become passive. They are no longer man-
possible to argue that depositors, as a special class of creditors, are especially in need
of protection.
19. West v. Camden, 135 U. S. 507 (1890); Teich v. Kaufman, 174 I1. App. 306
(1912); Noel v. Drake, 28 Kan. 265 (1882); Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501 (1876);
Dickson v. Baker, 75 Minn. 168, 77 N.W. 820 (1899); Van Slyke v. Andrews, 146
"Minn. 316, 178 N. W. 959 (1920); Jacobson v. Barnes, 176 Minn. 4, 222 N. W. 341'
(1928); Dubbs v. Kramer, 302 Pa. 455, 153 AtI. 733 (1933). Cf. Gage v. Fisher, 5 N.
D. 297, 65 N.W. 809 (1895); Hampton v. Buchanan, 51 Wash. 155, 98 Pac. 374
(1908) ; Timme v. Kopmeier, 162 Wis. 571, 156 N. W. 961 (1916). In Dubbs v. Kramer,
supra, the court even went so far as to approve the language of the lower court, which
had said that a director "cannot contract to use his vote for the benefit of anyone else,
or even for the benefit of the corporation."
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aging the corporate affairs and the contract consequently is illegal.20 The
theoretical possibility that the board of directors might disregard the
wishes of the majority stockholder is regarded.as so remote that usually
it is not deemed to merit even passing mention."L
From this brief summary of the lines of reasoning upon which con-
tracts of this type are invalidated, it will be noticed that one idea stands
out-the directors are prevented from exercising a free and independent
judgment in the selection of an executive officer and in that one respect
they have become a passive body. This predominance appears more
clearly when specific cases are considered. In the often-cited Manson v.
Curtis,' the agreement went much farther than the ordinary contract
outlined above and demonstrates quite distinctly what the courts mean
when they speak of a passive directorate. In substance the contract pro-
vided: (1) that the majority stockholder and the minority stockholder
should each have the right to name three directors and that a seventh
director should be named by a disinterested party to be mutually agreed
upon by the two of them; (2) that for one year the minority stockholder
should manage the corporate business, having the exclusive right not
only to administer the corporate affairs, but also to formulate the cor-
porate policies; and (3) that the president of the corporation "should
be only a nominal head as president." The court interpreted the contract
in the light of these and other provisions as creating not only a passive
president, as it did specifibally, but also by necessary implication a direc-
torate which was wholly subservient to the minority stockholder and
which in the language of the court was "a sterilized board of directors."
The court held that this contract was clearly contrary to public policy
and that it could not support an action for damages against the majority
stockholder for failure to carry out his obligations. The differences
between this contract and the ordinary agreement here under considera-
tion seem very evident, for it not only provided for the participation of
the minority stockholder in the corporate management, but also went on
20. This is largely speculation as to the line of argument a court actually would
take to invalidate such a contract. Clear cut decisions in this type of situation are ex-
tremely scarce, for the majority stockholder is almost invariably a director, and .vhere
the majority stockholder itself is a corporation, the manner in which the board of direc-
tors is rendered passive is not made clear. Thielsen v. Blake, Moffitt & Tovme, 142 Ore.
59, 17 P. (2d) 560 (1932). On the other hand cases can be found saying that since
stockholders are not fiduciaries, they may contract among themselves practically as they
please. See Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Wahlgren, 1 F. Supp. 799, 803 (N. D. Ill.
1932), aF'd on other grounds, 68 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934), cert. denied, 292 U. S.
639 (1934). Cf. Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. 3d,
1930).
21. But see Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 416, 199 N.E. 641, 643 (1936) ; Kantzler
v. Bensinger, 214 I1. 589, 598, 73 N.E. 874, 877 (1905).
22. 223 N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559 (1918).
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to attempt to vest in him the sole power to control the business of the
corporation, without consulting the board of directors, the other officers,
or even the majority stockholder.
These differences become more apparent by comparing the contract
in Manson v. Curtis with more typical contracts in three fairly recent
cases. In McQuade v. Stoneham2 the majority stockholder in the cor-
poration which operates the New York Giants' baseball team entered
into a contract with two minority stockholders, one of whom was the
immortal John McGraw and the other McQuade, the plaintiff in the case.
By this contract the three of them agreed "to use their best endeavors
for the purpose of continuing as directors of said Company and as officers
thereof", the majority stockholder as president at an annual salary of
$45,000, McGraw as vice-president at $7,500, and McQuade as treasurer
at $7,500. The contract further provided that "there shall be no change
in the said salaries . . or any matters regarding the policy of the
business of the corporation or any matters which in anywise affect,
endanger or interfere with the rights of the minority stockholders, ex-
cepting upon the mutual and unanimous consent of all the parties hereto."
In addition, the contract was to continue in force so long as the three
parties to the contract, or any of them, owned the shares of stock which
they owned at the date of the agreement. After a period of years during
which the corporation apparently was operated successfully under this
arrangement, the majority stockholder and McQuade disagreed upon
purely personal matters.24 As a consequence the majority stockholder
prevented the re-election of McQuade to his positions as director and
treasurer of the corporation. A suit by McQuade against the majority
stockholder for damages for wrongful discharge was dismissed by the
Court of Appeals of New York (with two judges dissenting on the
point here under consideration) on the ground that the contract was
against public policy and therefore unenforcible.25 The majority adhered
23. 263 N. Y. 323, 189 N. E. 234 (1934), (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 873. The majority
stockholder in the case was the late Charles Stoneham, well known to the sports pages
as the owner of the Giants. In addition to serving as vice-president, the late John Mc-
Graw managed the baseball team, and in that capacity was probably the most renovMed
of all big league managers. The ten National League pennants which the team won under
his guidance would seem indicative of his value to the corporation. While McQuade's
services do not appear to have been of such a spectacular nature, possibly they had their
own peculiar value at the time the contract was made. See note 25, infra.
24. The trial court expressly found that the reason for McQuade's discharge was a
series of personal quarrels with Stoneham which had no effect on the orderly and eflfitent
management of the corporate business, and also that McQuade "was removed by Stone-
ham for protecting the corporation and its minority stockholders."
25. A second ground upon which the decision was based was that at the time the
contract was made and until after his discharge, McQuade was a New York City magis-
trate. By statute city magistrates were prohibited from "engaging in a business." The
entire court regarded McQuade's duties as treasurer of the corporation as falling with
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to the usual line of argument, as is illustrated in the following excerpts
from the opinion:
"The stockholders may not, by private agreement among them-
selves, control the directors in the exercise of the judgment vested
in them by virtue of their office to elect officers and fix salaries....
"Stockholders *may, of course, combine to elect directors. That
rule is well settled .... The power to unite is, however, limited
to the election of directors and is not extended to contracts whereby
limitations are placed on the power of directors to manage the busi-
ness of the corporation by the selection of agents at defined salaries."
The majority opinion recognized the fact that contracts such as the one
before the court often did exist, tacit or otherwise, for convenience in
administering the affairs of corporations. It mentioned the fact that there
were other minority stockholders in the corporation who -were not parties
to the contract. But instead of emphasizing the most vulnerable feature
of the contract, namely the provision that there should be no change in
the business policy of the corporation without the unanimous consent
of the contracting parties, the majority stressed the point that the task
of passing on the question of whether public policy had been violated
sufficiently to require the invalidation of any particular contract was one
which courts were not properly qualified to perform. Therefore, rather
than attempting to ascertain whether the non-contracting stockholders
were in any wise endangered by the contract before the court, it laid
down an arbitrary rule for all situations by which all such contracts are
rendered unenforcible.28
The point of view of the majority was severely criticized in the dis-
senting opinion. Treating the problem on a practical level, the dissenting
judges pointed out that the majority stockholder by reason of his stock
ownership actually did control the board of directors, and consequently
was in a position to prevent the directors from ever exercising a really
independent and uncontrolled judgment in the selection of the corporate
officers. By the contract in question the majority stockholder had agreed
merely to share this control with McQuade and the other contracting
minority stockholder, and in this sharing of control the dissenters could
see nothing illegal. It was admitted that if the contract represented a
the prohibition of this statute, and that as a consequence he could not recover damages
"for loss of opportunity to perform services forbidden by la".
26. The majority said, "We are constrained by authority to hold that a contract is
illegal and void so far as it precludes the board of directors, at the risk of incurring
legal liability, from changing officers, salaries, or policies or retaining individuals in
office, except by consent of the contracting parties. On the whole, such a holding is
preferable to one which would open the courts to pass on the motives of directors in
the lawful exercise of their trust." See also Jacobson v. Barnes, 176 Minn. 4, 7, 222
N. V. 341, 342 (1928) ; Teich v. Kaufman, 174 Ill. App. 306, 312 (1912).
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"corrupt bargain" by which the three contracting stockholders were seek-
ing to despoil the corporation, as for example by taking excessive salaries,
the contract would be unenforcible, but that in the absence of such a
factor "public policy should be governed by facts and not by abstrac-
tions." Otherwise, the principal result of the majority holding was de-
clared to be the encouragement of sharp practice on the part of majority
stockholders in such situations.
The sequel to McQuade v. Stonehar was Clark v. Dodge,; which was
decided in 1936, two years later. The provisions of the contract involved
have been outlined above, being in substance that the minority stock-
holder should be a director and the general manager of the corporation,
and that in the latter capacity he should receive one-fourth of the net
income of the corporation either by way of dividends or by way of salary.
After conducting the business for about thirteen years under the con-
tract, the minority stockholder was ousted by the majority stockholder
from both of his positions, whereupon be brought an action for specific
performance to compel his reinstatement. The Appellate Division dis-
missed the complaint on the authority of McQuade v. Stoneham. On
appeal this holding was reversed and the complaint held to state a cause
of action.23 In an opinion written by one of the dissenters in McQuade
v. Stoneham, the Court of Appeals clearly departed from the majority
view in that decision and indicated that while as a general rule the func-
tion of the selection of the corporate officers was to be performed by the
board of directors, that rule was merely a "norm" from which variations
would be permitted so long as no one was injured by the enforcement of
the contract. Regarding the limitations imposed by the contract on the
power of the directors as very slight, the court looked to see whether
the contract actually injured or threatened to injure anyone. Since the
directors were the sole stockholders and were all parties to the contract,
the court could conceive of no one whom the enforcement of the contract
could possibly injure. Accordingly it could see no reason why the ma-
jority stockholder should not be held to his bargain.2
27. 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936), (1936) 36 Cot. L. R= 836.
28. The wisdom of entertaining a suit for specific performance of such a contract
is questionable upon practical grounds. To decree specific performance would compel
the contracting minority stockholder and the majority stockholder to be associated to-
gether in the management of the corporation. Such a forced relationship would rarely
be harmonious and might definitely injure rather than benefit the corporation. Come-
quently, in most cases it would seem that an action for damages would he a wiser remedy.
29. Three of the five judges who constituted the majority in McQuade v. Stoneham
were still on the court in 1936. No doubt the peculiar circumstances of Clark v. Dodge
were more responsible for their change of mind than any sudden alteration in their logic.
The case- strikingly portrayed the hardships which could ensue from the strict application
of the rule of McQuade v. Stoneham, for the plaintiff, a chemist, had turned over to the
corporation secret formulae known only to him in exchange for the rights given him
under the contract, and presumably these formulae were among the more valuable assets
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The last of the three recent cases is Hayden v. Beane, 0 where two
stockholders, who owned all the voting stock of the corpuration, wished
to secure the services of an individual named Hayden as the general
manager of the corporation's distillery."' In order to induce Hayden to
take this position the two stockholders agreed: (1) that they would
transfer to Hayden twenty-four shares of stock in the corporation, thus
making him a minority stockholder; (2) that they would cause to be
elected to the board of directors Hayden and such other person as Hayden
should nominate; (3) that they would elect as the three remaining direc-
tors such individuals as would continue Hayden in the office of president
of the corporation so long as he should "faithfully and honestly serve
it"; and (4) that they would not sell their stock except to each other
without first offering it to the board of directors, who might purchase
it for the corporation or for themselves individually. In turn Hayden
agreed to accept election to the positions of director and president pro-
of the corporation. To invalidate the contract would have been so patently unjust that
the rule, accordingly, was modified.
30. 199 N. E. 755 (Mass. 1936). In a more recent case, Mansfield v. Lang, 200 N. E.
110 (Mass. 1936),. the plaintiff was majority stockholder in each of two corporations
and the defendant oned the controlling interest in a third corporation, all three of which
were engaged in the publishing business. Having decided to combine the three enterprises,
the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract to organize a holding company, and
by which the plaintiff was to "undertake the actual management of the combined com-
panies" for at least three years at a monthly salary of $500. Upon completion of the
organization of the holding company the defendant held a majority of its shares, the
remainder being owned by the plaintiff and two other persons, one of whom was a rela-
tive and the other a close friend of the majority stockholder. After the business had been
operated about a year under this arrangement, the board of directors of the holding com-
pany discharged the plaintiff from his position of general manager. The plaintiff sued
the defendant for breach of the agreement and was allowed to recover damages.
The case is unusual so far as the question of injury to the non-contracting stockholders
is concerned. In the holding company the two non-contracting stockholders were closely
associated with the majority stockholder and had complete knowledge of the transaction,
one of them even witnessing the signing of the agreement. Hence, the element of secrecy
in the making of the contract was absent and the non-contracting stockholders can be
said to have acquiesced in the action of the majority stockholder. But the contract called
not only for the plaintiff to manage the holding company, but also the three subsidiaries.
The two subsidiaries in which the plaintiff had held the controlling interest had minority
stockholders who were not parties to the contract and possibly had no knowledge of its
precise terms. On the other hand the plaintiff was their representative in the manage-
ment of the combined businesses and the consequence of his ouster might well be to harm
rather than benefit their interests.
31. The statement that the entire stock of the corporation was owned by the two
individual defendants appears in the court's opinion. Actually, however, the agreement
also was signed by a third person who either was a stockholder at the date of tie con-
tract or became one prior to its breach. No information could be obtained as to the
exact proportion in which these three held the stock, but apparently they worked together
as a unit so that for the purposes of the problem here they may be regarded as occupying
the position of a single majority stockholder.
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vided he was tendered also a contract acceptable to him arranging for
his services as general manager of the corporation for seven years. After
Hayden had been elected a director and president differences developed
and the majority stockholders refused to transfer to him the twenty-four
shares of stock. Still later they caused another person to be elected
director and president in Hayden's stead. Hayden then sought by a bill
in equity to have the shares owned by the majority stockholders applied
in satisfaction of his claim for damages. In this proceeding the majority
stockholders entered a demurrer raising the defense that the contract
contravened public policy. In overruling the demurrer and holding the
contract valid, the court pointed out that all the stockholders were parties
to the contract. The point of view taken by the court is illustrated in the
following quotation from the opinion:
"It is evident from these provisions of the contract that the indi-
vidual defendants believed that the best interests of the corporation
required that the plaintiff be elected to those offices and that he should
serve as its general manager for a term of at least seven years. The
agreement so far as appears was entered into by the parties in good
faith with the mutual understanding and belief that it would result
in benefit to the corporation and to the stockholders. We are unable
to find that it was against public policy or illegal on any other
ground."
The fact that in Clark v. Dodge and Hayden v. Beane the courts up-
held contracts of the type under consideration here is significant. But
of even more importance is the method adopted by those courts to ascer-
tain whether or not such contracts should be invalidated on the ground
of public policy. In looking at the specific contracts involved in the
cases before them to see whether they actually injured or threatened to
injure anyone, and in applying the rule that the affairs of a corporation
shall be managed by its board of directors as a relative instead of an
absolute standard, these courts have commenced what seems to be a
departure from the traditional point of view. This departure is to be
welcomed for the tendency of most courts to invalidate similar agree-
ments produced many results which were clearly inequitable and unnec-
essary, and indeed, rather than furthering any public good, militated
against it. The traditional approach has been quite unrealistic and the
line of argument used to support the results reached has often been un-
convincing. It is high time for many other courts to reappraise this rule
of public policy and permit recovery of damages, as did the New York
and Massachusetts courts in Clark z,. Dodge and Hayden v. Beane. 2
32. It should be pointed out that a contract of this type can never afford the con-
tracting minority stockholder a right of action against the majority stoclholder where
he has been discharged from his executive position for cause. A condition of every con-
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In making such a reappraisal it should be pointed out that the present
quarrel is not with the rule of public policy itself so much as it is with
the manner of its application to the one particular situation of a corpora-
tion with a single majority stockholder.-i One feasible method of apply-
ing the canon in a manner which will achieve the most desirable results
possible is to analyze the facts of each particular case by making two
inquiries. The first inquiry is whether the contract involved in the case
has caused or threatens to cause some actual and tangible injury to the
non-contracting minority stockholders, who are most likely to be en-
dangered, or to anyone else. Since in the ordinary case the answer will
be in the negative, a second inquiry must then be made as to the extent
to which the contract limits the ability of the board of directors to reach
an independent and uncontrolled judgment in matters or corporate man-
agement, or stated differently, -the extent to which the contracts causes
a deviation from the rule that the affairs of a corporation shall be man-
aged by its board of directors.
To elaborate on these two inquiries, it should be clear that the first
is purely a practical one. It should be made wholly without regard to
the existence of the rule that the board of directors shall manage the
business of a corporation, for the question is simply whether it can be
demonstrated that some pecuniary damage has resulted or will result to
the non-contracting minority stockholders if the contract is upheld. For
tract is that he will be competent, honest and loyal. Often this condition will be express
as in the contracts in Clark v. Dodge and Hayden t. Beane, and where not so expressed,
it will be implied by the court. Fells v. Katz, 256 N. Y. 67, 175 N. E. 516 (1931). But
cf. Matter of Allied Fruit & Extract Co., 243 App. Div. 52, 276 N. Y. Supp. 153 (1st
Dep't 1934).
33. In view of the tendency of most courts to regard the rule as a prophylactic meas-
ure designed to prevent any interference with the board of directors, it seems that the
most useful approach is to assume that the rule is justified as a general principle of cor-
poration law and then seek to'apply it in a manner which will achieve the most beneficial
results possible. However, it can be argued with considerable force that the sole purpose
of the rule is to protect minority stockholders, and, consequently, a showing in a given
case that no injury can result to them from the contract would make an application of
the rule so totally unjustified that even an agreement which divested the directors of all
their functions should be upheld. This argument carries particular weight in* respect to
selecting corporate officers, for this function is not one which peculiarly belongs to the
board of directors, as is demonstrated.by the fairly recent enactment in several states of
statutes expressly permitting the stockholders to choose the officers. Dzm. Ruv. CoDs
(1935) § 2042; N. J. Ray. STAT. (1937) tit. 14, c. 7, § 6; N. M. STAT. A.;.n. (Court-
right, 1929) § 32-113; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 1144; PA. STAT. Awm. (Pur-
don, Supp. 1938) tit. 15, § 2852-406. Moreover, implicit permission to the same effect
exists in five other states where statutes provide that officers shall be selected: (1) either
by the directors or as provided in the by-laws (Maryland); (2) as prescribed in the
certificate of incorporation or in the by-laws (Minnesota and Rhode Island); and (3) as
provided in the by-laws (Florida and Wyoming). Under such provisions it would seem
that the function of selecting the officers could properly be allocated to the stockholders.
HeinOnline  -- 47 Yale L. J. 1093 1937-1938
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
example, such damage may occur where the contracting minority stock-
holder manifestly is incompetent to perform the duties of the specified
executive position, or where the rate of compensation provided for in the
contract is grossly unreasonable. 4 Though variations in degree may be
present, a court often will be able to perceive readily the precise injury
which has occurred or which is certain to occur and trace it in part at
least to the existence of a contract of this type. In such a case there is
no quarrel with the application of this rule of public policy for it affords
a convenient method of remedying a wrong done.
But in the vast majority of the decided cases no such tangible injury
or threat of injury to the non-contracting minority stockholders, or to
anyone else, is present. Instead the situation will be one where after
the contract has been in force, some difference, often purely personal
as in McQuade v. Stoneham, develops between the parties to the con-
tract. Then the majority stockholder ousts the contracting minority
stockholder from his executive position, and when sued for breach of
contract the majority stockholder falls back on the rule of public policy
as a justification for his action. Logically, if it can be demonstrated
that no minority stockholder can possible be harmed by the contract, the
reason for the rule would seem to disappear and the contract should be
upheld. But since it always is extremely difficult to point out any specific
damage to the non-contracting stockholders, who are not even parties
to the suit,3 5 many courts will pass over this possibility of injury and
rely upon the fact that in limiting the power of the board of directors
to form an independent and uncontrolled judgment the contract violates
a hallowed precept of corporation law. So it is to this aspect of the
problem that the second inquiry is directed.
Accepting the attitude that observation of the rule that a corporation
shall be managed by its board of directors is an end in itself, a possible
solution is to regard that rule as setting a standard. But since it is
believed for various reasons set forth above that it is highly undesirable
to make this standard an absolute one, as did the court in McQuade v.
Stoneham, the better point of view is to treat it as an approximation
34. The courts frequently must pass on questions involving the reasonableness of a
salary or of a term of employment, and while such questions may be difficult to decide,
they are not impossible. E.g., Sagalyn v. Meekins, Packard & Wheat, Inc., 290 Mass. 434,
195 N: E. 769 (1935) ; Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N. W.
586 (1922).
35. It, .nly one case has a non-contracting minority stockholder intervened and at-
tacked the validity of the contract. In Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S. IV.
376 (1917), the corporation involved published the Louisville Courier-Journal. Colonel
Henry Watterson, its famous editor and Democratic leader, was the non-contracting
minority stockholder. He intervened in the suit and claimed his minority interest was
prejudiced by the contract. In invalidating the contract the court quite properly placed
considerable emphasis on his intervention.
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from which reasonable deviations will be permitted. Thus, the problem
becomes one of fixing the limits within which these deviations will be
allowed in the belief that such reasonable deviations will not injure any-
one. One illustration is furnished by Clark v. Dodge where, the question
of actual injury to anyone being absent, the court held that the departure
from the standard set by the rule of public policy was so slight as to
make application of the rule unnecessary. Another is Manson v. Curtis
where, despite the allegation that the breach of the contract by the ma-
jority stockholder had rendered the corporation's stock worthless, the
deviation from the standard was so great the court felt that the contract
should not be enforced. There the emphasis was not on the injury or
threat of injury to non-contracting stockholders, but on the departure
from a principle, adherence to which the court said was "absolutely
necessary."
Considered in this manner the problem becomes one of whether the
ordinary contract of this type amounts only to a slight deviation which
should be permitted or to a great one which should be forbidden. At roost
the board of directors is prevented by such a contract from reaching an
independent and uncontrolled judgment in only three respects. The direc-
tors 'have no choice but to select the contracting minority stodolder for
the executive position specified in the contract, they have no discretion in
fixing the amount of compensation which he shall receive, and finally they
have no control over the length of time for which he shall hold that office.
Even though its purpose is to secure a skilled executive to superintend
the entire business of the corporation, the usual contract never purports
to give him any dictatorial power over the board of directors. His
decisions in managing the business are still subject to the control of the
directors, and certainly the most important function of the board, that
of formulating corporate policies, is but little limited by the agreement.
In some instances it is true that more than one minority stockholder will
be assured a position in the management by the contract so that all the
executive offices may be filled in accordance with its terms, but even so
the question remains one of degree and the directors still will have a
substantial amount of control.3 But confining the problem to the usual
36. Where it is evident that such a contract is part of a scheme by which one or
more individuals are "purchasing" positions in-the corporate management, ample justi-
fication for invalidating the contract exists. However, this is more likely to occur in
the situation where a number of stockholders, none of whom own a majority stock inter-
est, band together for the purpose of getting one or more of their number a particular
office or offices. Cf. Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S. E. 487 (1903) ; Williams v. Fred-
ericks, 187 La. 987, 175 So. 642 (1937) ; Cone v. Russell, 48 N. J. Eq. 203. 21 Atl. 847
(1891). The distinction between these two situations has been recognized by one court.
See In re Will of Pittock, 102 Ore. 159, 176, 199 Pac. 633, 638, 17 A. L A. 218 (1921),
where the court said, "The vicious principle of illegal combination of directors to pursue
certain policies generally for their own aggrandizement seems to be that each surrenders
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situation it seems that such a contract falls far short of creating a passive
directorate and that the deviation from the standard set by the rule is so
slight as not to justify invalidation of the contract.
That this is the proper conclusion is demonstrated more forcibly when
attention is focused on the peculiar position of the single majority stock-
holder. As pointed out heretofore, the idea that such a contract renders
the directors passive is based upon the recognition of the fact that the
majority stockholder actually does control the board of directors. Because
of this control it seems evident that even in the absence of a contract of
this sort, the board of directors may be subservient to the majority stock-
holder and always may defer to his judgment in managing the corporate
affairs. This is especially true in the small corporation with only a few
stockholders, where many of the directors may be little more than dum-
mies. The majority stockholder really manages the corporate business,
and an innocent, independent board of directors, ready to be corrupted
by the employment contract, simply does not exist.
Inevitably, the majority stockholder has control over the board of
directors. All he does by this type of contract is to share that control
with a minority stockholder. It would be difficult for the contract to
render passive a board of directors which is already passive. Though
it may be argued that where such a contract exists the majority stock-
holder is more likely to use his control than where there is no contract,
the question is but one of degree and the principle remains the same.
Viewed thus, it is immaterial that the majority stockholder, in either
his capacity as director or as majority stockholder, may be regarded as
occupying a fiduciary position. This fiduciary argument may have some
merit where the majority stockholder derives some personal advantage
from the contract, as for example, where he receives a pecuniary con-
sideration from the contracting minority stockholder for entering into
the agreement. But in most cases no such element of private gain is
present.37 Indeed, with at least as much force as the public policy argu-
ment made by the courts, it may be contended in the same vein that by
making such a contract the majority stockholder, rather than limiting
in advance his individual judgment irrespective of the good of the corporation or the rights
of the other stockholders. The essence of the fault lies in the combination, which cannot
exist where a single majority stockholder, for himself and in the management of his own
property, formulates a certain corporate policy and undertakes to carry it out."
37. So far as the argument which is used to invalidate contracts of this type is con-
cerned, the element of private gain to the majority stockholder is not material, and the
courts often expressly say so. See West v. Camden, 135 U. S. 507, 521 (1890); Snow
v. Church, 13 App. Div. 108, 110, 42 N. Y. Supp. 1072, 107 (2d Dep't 1897). But where
it is found in a case, the court usually will refer to it. Dickson v. Baker, 75 Minn. 168,
77 N. W. 820 (1899); Thomas v. Mathews, 94 Ohio St. 32, 113 N. E. 669 (1916). Cf.
McClure v. Law, 161 N. Y. 78, 55 N. E. 388 (1899) ; Thielsen v. Blake, Moffltt & Towne,
142 Ore. 59, 17 P. (2d) 560 (1932).
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his own free and independent judgment, is exercising it in the best in-
terests of the corporation. Where the corporation needs someone to fill a
certain executive position, such as that of general manager, it is the
contract of the majority stockholder which makes it possible to get the
services of the person best fitted for the position.
Obviously a court taking a realistic point of view is able to uphold
an agreement of this type more readily than one which places its em-
phasis on the legal theory. Yet one variety of the ordinary contract
has sometimes been upheld on theoretical grounds, which upon analysis
strikingly reveal the artificiality of the whole doctrine. This variation
occurs where the corporation itself becomes an obligor on the contract
along with the majority stockholder in an attempt to give the new
executive double assurance of his right to participate in the corporate
management.3
The argument made to uphold such an agreement is that ordinarily
there is little doubt but that a corporation may enter into a contract hiring
some individual, whether a minority stockholder or not, for some position
in the corporate management, for a reasonable term at a reasonable
compensation. The choice of the individual with whom the contract is
made is a function of the board of directors, so that when the directors
cause the corporation to enter into a contract with the minority stock-
holder they actually are exercising their own judgment, and instead of
being a passive board their are an active one. The fact that the majority
stockholder enters into an obligation similar io that of the corporation
is immaterial, for if the legal theory is adhered to, the majority stock-
holder has no control over the board of directors.20 This provides a neat
solution for the problem wholly within the rule of public policy that the
board of directors shall manage the corporate affairs, since the board
is doing exactly that. The weakness of the argument is obvous--the
directors, in making the contract on behalf of the corporation, merely
are following the wishes of the majority stockholder and hardly are
38. Reed & Fibre Products Corp. v. Rosenthal, 153 Md. 501, 138 At. 665 (1927).
Cf. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Wahlgren, I F. Supp. 799 (N. D. Ill., 1932), aff'd on
other grounds, 68 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934), ceri. denied, 292 L. S. 639 (1934).
See Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 645, 197 S. V. 376, 380 (1917). Of course,
the corporation cannot agree that the minority stockholder shall be a director, so the sole
effect of its being made a party to the contract is in connection vAth the obligation that
he shall hold a certain executive position.
39. In Reed & Fibre Products Corp. v. Rosenthal, 153 'Lid. 501, 138 At. 665 (1927),
the court said, "If a corporation by contract agrees to do something which it has the
power to do, it is to be presumed that it acted for its best interest, and the fact that its
largest stockholder jointly and severally entered into the same contract with the other
party to it cannot detract from the legality or the enforceabiliy of such a contract. There
can be no question of public policy involved, for the reason that the stocholder has only
bound himself to do what the corporation has theretofore agreed to do."
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exercising an independent and uncontrolled judgment. But a court which
said that in this situation the board of directors was just as passive as
where the corporation was not a party to the contract could not refuse
to go a step farther and say that the board of directors was passive re-
gardless of the existence of any contract. Then it would have to uphold
the contract on this latter ground, or else involve itself in a morass of
contradictions.
In conclusion it should be emphasized that in the situation of the
corporation with a single majority stockholder there seems to be no
justification for an arbitrary rule invalidating all contracts of the type
under consideration. Within the confines of that situation, the cases in-
volving tangible injury to anyone should be handled on the basis of their
own particular facts. As stated by the court in Clark v. Dodge, "damage
suffered or threatened is a logical and practical test" and is the one which
should be adopted generally.4" But whatever the rule of law may be,
the reasonable use of such contracts achieves a very practical end. As
such, no doubt lawyers will continue to draw them, and if the tendency
of the New York court in Clark v. Dodge and that of the Massachusetts
court in Hayden v. Beane and Mansfield v. Lang4 continues to grow,
it would seem that eventually such contracts will be legally acceptable
everywhere. In the meantime, a lawyer framing such an agreement for
a contracting minority stodcholder should resort to every possible device
which will lessen vulnerability on the ground that the agreement is against
public policy. In a few states there is the possibility of taking advantage
of the statutory provisions which permit the stockholders to select the
corporate officers. By the enactment of an appropriate by-law provision
this function may be allocated to the stockholders and thereupon the rule
that a corporation shall be managed by its board of directors would be-
come wholly irrelevant.,
But since this method will not be available in most jurisdictions, a
lawyer should endeavor to make all the stockholders parties to the con-
tract, as often may be possible in the case of a corporation with only a
few stockholders. If this cannot be done he should at least bring the
existence of the contract to the attention of the non-contracting minority
stockholders, or even better, have them confirm it at a meeting of the
stockholders. Much of the dislike of the courts for these contracts lies
in their apprehension that the majority stockholder and the contracting
40. In addition to Clark -i. Dodge and Hayden v. Beane, the following cases tend to
support this approach: Weber v. Della Mt. Mining Co., 14 Idaho 404, 94 Pac. 441 (1918) ;
Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416 (1870) ; Thompson v. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 II. 54,
116 N. E:648 (1917); Horn v. Nessen Lumber Co., 236 Ill. App. 187 (1925); Mansfield
v. Lang, 200 N. E. 110 (Mass. 1936); Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S. W. 486 (1897);
Winsor v. Commonwealth Coal Co., 63 Wash. 62, 114 Pac. 908 (1911). See also Com-
ment (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rrv. 585.
41. See note 30, supra.
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minority stockholder may defraud the rest of the stockholders by a secret
agreement. By informing the stockholders of the existence of &.e con-
tract the attorney will have done much to reduce the chance cf a later
holding that anyone was injured by the contract. Then secondly, if the
law of his particular jurisdiction permits it, he should have the corpora-
tion itself, acting through its board of directors, become a party to the
contract along with the majority stockholder. In this way he will be
able to show that the board of directors took some action with respect
to the selection of the contracting minority stockholder for the executive
position. Thirdly, it may be of some advantage not to have the majority
stockholder as a member of the board of directors, and thus eliminate
the objection that a limitation has been imposed directly on the exercise
by the majority stockholder of his free and independent judgment in his
fiduciary capacity as a director. If this is not feasible, at least language
should be avoided which expressly binds the majority stockholder in
that capacity. Finally, a lawyer should exercise great care as to the
degree to which the contract limits the power of the board of directors
to manage the corporate affairs. He should be wary of any provision
which purports to confer on the contracting minority stockholder any
exclusive power to manage the corporate enterprise and he should attempt
to confine the contract to the selection of the minority stockholder for
the specified executive office. He should endeavor to be certain that the
qualifications of the contracting minority stockholder are suitable for
that position and that the compensation is reasonable. If possible, he
should limit the term of the contract to the definite number of years
which is most likely to be regarded as reasonable in his particular juris-
diction. A lawyer who has done all these things should feel fairly safe
that if it is ever necessary to test the validity of the contract, a court
will be forced to ridiculous lengths to hold the agreement unlawful.
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